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THE BOARD RETREATS: A VIABLE SOLUTION
TO THE DECISION-BARGAINING CONTROVERSY?
by Boyd Mangrum
Under section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act,' employers
are obligated to bargain collectively concerning "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment."' Thus, if a subject can be included within this
language, it is a mandatory subject of bargaining-there can be no lawful re-
fusal to bargain over such a topic.' For many subjects, such as plant rules,"
"no strike" clauses,' and pensions," it has been relatively easy to determine
whether they are mandatory subjects of bargaining. One area, however, has
not lent itself to easy classification. The area of management decisions to sub-
contract work, to remove or sell plants, or to partially close plants! has been
the subject of much litigation, yet the law remains confused. Whether such
topics are mandatory subjects of bargaining or, alternatively, exclusively ex-
ecutive decisions properly reserved to managerial discretion, has not been
conclusively determined.8 It shall be the purpose of this Comment to trace the
development of this problem area, to examine the solutions that have been
proposed, and, finally, to assess the present direction of the law."
I. THE BOARD VERSUS THE COURTS
There seems little doubt that the 1964 United States Supreme Court de-
cision in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB'* was the genesis of the
question under consideration. The Court found that the particular form of
subcontracting at issue-"replacement of employees in the existing bargaining
unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under
similar conditions of employment"I' -was a mandatory subject of bargaining."
Justice Stewart concurred, but pointed out in his separate opinion that the type
of subcontracting involved fell "short of such larger entrepreneurial questions
as what shall be produced, how capital shall be invested in fixed assets, or what
129 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970). For studies of the legislative history of the Act, see R.
CORTNER, THE WAGNER AcT CASES (1964), and Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin
and Current Significance, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 199 (1960).
229 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5), (d) (1970).
'NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).4 Miller Brewing Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 90 (1967).
'Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
'Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 960 (1949).
'The closing of plants may involve problems other than those involving § 8(a) (5).
For an analysis of them, see Bliss, Labor's Plant Closure Pains, 24 SW. L.J. 259 (1970).
' The legislative history of the Act is not particularly helpful in this area. The general
view is that the lack of such history and the vague wording in the Act necessitate the Board's
defining the area of the duty to bargain, subject, of course, to judicial review. See Smith,
The Evolution of the "Duty To Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MIcH. L. REv.
1066 (1941). Congressional efforts in 1947 to define the bargaining duty more explicitly
were not successful. See generally Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by
the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REv. 389 (1950).
8 The complex area of remedies for refusal to bargain in this area is, of course, beyond
the scope of this Comment.10379 U.S. 203 (1964).
111d. at 215.
"
2 The Court thus held that the Board was empowered to order resumption of operations
and reinstatement with back pay. Id.
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the basic scope of the enterprise shall be."" It was Justice Stewart's contention
that the Court's holding could not be extended to determine if "any aspects
of those larger issues could under any circumstances be considered subjects of
compulsory collective bargaining."14 Justice Stewart's view of the limited nature
of the decision is not evident from a reading of the majority opinion. It stated
that "the contracting out of work performed by members of the bargaining
unit might appropriately be called a 'condition of employment.' The words even
more plainly cover termination of employment which ... necessarily results
from the contracting out of work performed by members of the established
bargaining unit."" If the Court meant to say that any subject concerning ter-
mination of employment fits the statutory definition of "conditions of employ-
ment," then the holding of the case is broad indeed. Under this conception, a
vast number of previously managerial decisions which involve termination of
employment would be considered mandatory bargaining subjects. The Court
felt that its decision was not so expansive, and that it "need not and does not
encompass other forms of 'contracting out' or 'subcontracting' which arise daily
in our complex economy."' " The Supreme Court has not considered the question
raised in Fibreboard since that decision," so the National Labor Relations Board
and the circuits have been left to develop the law according to their own in-
terpretations of the Fibreboard holding.
Prior to 1962 the Board held the view that, although an employer did not
have to bargain concerning the decision to subcontract, he was required to
bargain with the union concerning the effects of such a decision on the bargain-
ing unit. In its 1962 Town & Country Manufacturing Co. decision,"9 the
Board extended its doctrine to include a requirement of bargaining over the
decision itself. The Board has even formulated a set of criteria to use in de-
ciding whether a specific subcontracting decision requires bargaining."0
The Board could have chosen to go no further than this in the development
" Id. at 225.
14 Id.
" Id. at 210.
" Id. at 215.
1" Two cases other than Fibreboard have frequently been cited by writers in this area,
although, strictly speaking, they are not relevant since they did not involve S 8(a) (5) of
the National Labor Relations Act. The Board has placed reliance upon Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). The Supreme Court held that
termination of employment was a "condition of employment" concerning which there was
a duty to bargain. The Court spoke in broad language of the expanding scope of mandatory
bargaining subjects, and that language has frequently been cited by the Board. The case,
however, was decided under the Railway Labor Act, and not the National Labor Relations
Act, so it is not direct precedent for the topic being considered here.
Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), is the favorite
citation of the courts for the proposition that an employer may completely shut down his
plant, even if motivated by anti-union bias, and not violate § 8(a) (3) by doing so. While
the case appears to be a strong endorsement by the Court of management's freedom to act
in this area, it is distinguishable since it did not involve any alleged § 8(a) (5) violations.
" See, e.g., Bickford Shoes, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1954); Diaper Jean Mfg. Co.,
109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Brown Truck, 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
"136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cit. 1963).
51 The suggested criteria are: whether the subcontracting was motivated solely by eco-
nomic considerations, whether the employer has traditionally subcontracted similar types
and quantities of work, whether the subcontracting would have a significant adverse impact
on employees in the bargaining unit, and whether the union had the opportunity to bargain
over the subcontracting at general negotiating meetings. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 150
N.L.R.B. 1574, 1577 (1965).
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of its "decision-bargaining" 1 requirement; instead, it gave a broad interpre-
tation of the Fibreboard decision and extended the doctrine to cases other than
ones involving subcontracting. In Royal Plating & Polishing Co."' the Board
held that section 8(a) (5) requires an employer to bargain over a decision to
close part of a business. The Board explained its general approach to this area
in Ozark Trailers, Inc.,"2 another partial closure situation. In that case the
Board considered Fibreboard and expressed its feeling:
[JJust as the employer has invested capital in the business, so the employee has
invested years of his working life, accumulating seniority, accruing pension
rights, and developing skills that may or may not be salable to another em-
ployer. And, just as the employer's interest in the protection of his capital
investment is entitled to consideration in our interpretation of the Act, so too
is the employee's interest in the protection of his livelihood.'
Based upon this reasoning, the Board rejected the argument that the partial
closing of a business is essentially a matter of traditional management preroga-
tive. The Board noted that parties frequently resorted to bargaining when such
matters were being considered, and apparently placed great value on the
"mediating influence"' that collective bargaining might have. The Board has
consistently adhered to its position in Ozark Trailers in cases involving plant
relocationsM and partial shutdowns. 7
The federal appellate courts, reading Fibreboard more narrowly than the
Board, have refused to enforce Board decisions calling for decision-bargaining
in cases other than subcontracting."2 The courts have stressed the fact that
under the particular circumstances involved in Fibreboard there was no change
in the company's basic operation after the subcontracting decision. "Therefore,
to require the employer to bargain about the matter would not significantly
abridge his freedom to manage the business.""9 The courts' almost unanimous
refusal to apply Fibreboard to any cases other than those involving identical
fact situations has been described as "unsettling" and not warranted by prior
case law or the historical development of bargaining topics under the Act."°
2" The term "decision-bargaining" will be used herein to indicate mandatory bargaining
about an economic decision. The term "effect-bargaining" will be used to indicate manda-
tory bargaining about the post-decision effects upon the wages, terms, and conditions of
employment of the employees.
22 152 N.L.R.B. 619 (1965).
21 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
24ld. at 566.25 ld. at 568.
"
8 See, e.g., McLoughlin Mfg. Corp., 182 N.L.R.B. 958 (1970) (but here the Board
only required effect-bargaining as a remedy since the relocation was an accomplished fact);
Weltronic Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 235, enforced, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cit. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 938 (1970).
27See, e.g., Drapery Mfg. Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 1706 (1968), partially enforced, 425 F.2d
1026 (8th Cit. 1970); Thompson Transp. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 746 (1967), enforcement
denied, 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cit. 1969).28 See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prods., Inc., 439 F.2d 40 (6th Cit. 1971); NLRB v.
Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cit. 1969); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation
Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cit. 1967); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350
F.2d 191 (3d Cit. 1965). One court has even refused to enforce a decision-bargaining order
in a subcontracting case by distinguishing the facts of the case from those in Pibreboard.
NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
"2Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213 (1964).
"Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: The Search for
[Vol. 26
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II. STANDARDS FOR RECOGNIZING MANDATORY BARGAINING SUBJECTS
Due to the conflicting stances of the Board and the courts with respect to the
duty to bargain over management decisions in this area," several proposals
have been made as to what criteria should ideally be applied in such situations.
Most of the commentators seem to start from the implicit assumption that at
least some decision-bargaining should be required. Although frequent doubts
have been expressed as to the wisdom of abridging management's traditional
freedom of action, it nevertheless is generally conceded that the modern trend
is to increase the participation of employees in the making of management de-
cisions which vitally affect their conditions of employment."2 The primary dis-
pute now seems to be over the development of workable standards which
could be applied to determine what particular management decisions are
mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Contractual Rights. This approach would allow the rights and duties of the
parties as to decision-bargaining to be made solely a function of the contract.
The feeling is that, since the law is so unclear in this area, and since virtually
all management decisions might be held to affect the terms and conditions of
employment within the meaning of the Act, then management should be
able to protect itself at the bargaining table."8 Under this view, if, at contract
negotiations, the union was unable to secure, for example, a clause barring
subcontracting, then the employer would be free to make such a decision uni-
laterally, although bargaining would be required concerning the effects of
the decision. Long Lake Lumber Co., which allows management to insist upon
a management-rights clause, is cited as a step in the right direction."
Of course, statutory rights can often be waived, and it is likely that manage-
ment-rights clauses will continue to be used." Unfortunately, there are several
reasons why this standard should not be given serious consideration. The basic
misconception in this approach is the failure to recognize that the duty to
bargain is a statutory requirement, not a function of what the parties have
finally incorporated in their bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court has
held that sections 8(a) (5) and 8(d) "establish the obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative of its employees to bargain with each other in
good faith with respect to 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment. . . .' The duty is limited to those subjects, and within that area
neither party is legally obligated to yield.""N Thus, under the statute and the
Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty To Bargain, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 803, 813(1971).
"Tearea has sparked scholarly as well as judicial conflict. For the opposing views, see
the two addresses entitled Management Prerogatives: The Limits of Mandatory Bargaining
by Bakaly (management view) and Sheinkman (labor view) in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL
FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 255, 289 (1971).
2 See Rabin, supra note 30, at 815-16.
'a Nelson, Through a Looking Glass Darkly: Fibreboard Five Years Later, 21 LAB. L.J.
755 (1970).
m 182 N.L.R.B. 435 (1970), cited in Nelson, supra note 33, at 760.
" The Board has recently upheld the use of a management-rights clause which allowed
the employer to unilaterally contract out work. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 197 N.L.R.B.
No. 118, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 5 24,311 (June 20, 1972).
'NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
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interpretive case law, there is a duty to bargain over mandatory subjects; the
only question is whether a subject falls within the statutory phrase and is,
therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining. The lack of precision in the law
relative to this area may be deplorable, but it does not warrant a complete
abandonment of the principles which have thus far developed. Allowing the
contract to control the scope of the duty to bargain would deprive labor of its
statutory right to participate in at least some of the decision-making vital to
its interests.
Past Practices and the Likelihood of Resolution. In Fibreboard Chief Justice
Warren mentioned two standards which should be considered when deter-
mining whether a decision is a mandatory subject of bargaining." The first
standard is an examination of past industry practices; the second is the likeli-
hood of resolution at the bargaining table. The Chief Justice admitted that such
considerations are "not determinative."" Nevertheless, one commentator has
suggested that such considerations should be the only standards used."
It is submitted that the adoption of such standards and their application on
a case-by-case basis would effectively abrogate the developing duty of manage-
ment to bargain in this area. The first standard seems to embody the feeling
that if in the past such decisions have been the subject of voluntary bargaining,
then, thereafter, the decision should be held to be a mandatory subject. The
second standard is apparently an expression of the belief that in some cases
employees may not be competent to assist in technical management decisions,
and that other management decisions may be motivated by strong economic
considerations which could not be outweighed by any union concession. There
seems little doubt that in every case management would strongly contend that
nothing the union could offer could possibly affect its ultimate decision, that
the matter was highly technical in nature, that it was motivated solely by ir-
reversible economic trends, and that there was no industrial history of bargain-
ing over such decisions. The union would surely differ on these points. The
result could be that the parties would frequently end up in protracted nego-
tiations over whether they were required to bargain about the decision. Under
such flexible and argumentative criteria, it is unlikely that the duty to bargain
would develop along recognizable and consistent lines. Furthermore, there are
legitimate questions about the desirability of measuring the present duty to
bargain by examining past bargaining practices. The employees' vital interests,
the "terms and conditions" of their employment, might be involved regardless
of whether the decision had historically been the subject of collective bargain-
ing. History may be instructive, but it should not be used to condition the
statutory rights of employees in this instance.
Similarly, the "likelihood of resolution at the bargaining table" standard
has intrinsic difficulties of application. Clearly, the employees involved will
certainly view themselves as competent to participate in decision-making af-
7 379 U.S. at 211.
88 Id.
" Rabin, supra note 30, at 821. It should be noted that Professor Rabin recognized
several limitations on applying the Fibreboard doctrine.
[Vol. 26
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fecting their livelihoods. The argument that some decisions are motivated by
economic considerations that cannot be affected by union concessions or sug-
gestions does not withstand scrutiny. In almost all cases union concessions con-
cerning wages, hours, or other terms might conceivably have some influence
on management decision-making. Even in an extreme example, such as the
Government's prohibition of the manufacture of a particular product, the
union might still be able to make a meaningful suggestion as to the possibility
of continuing use of plant facilities and workers by switching to related pro-
duction. The value of the union's suggestion would be enhanced by the skills
and experience of the workers involved. Thus, it may be said that the Fibre-
board criteria are too flexible, are unsuited to rational application, and do not
adequately preserve the interests of employees. It is no doubt true that:
In the United States in particular, management of society's scarce resources
is vested primarily in private enterprise, and the amazing productivity of the
American economy is, without much question, tied closely to the ingenuity,
imagination, competence and freedom of action of private business manage-
ment.
On the other hand, maximizing the real output of goods and services, while
critically important, is not and should not be the sole concern of society. Total
dedication to such an objective may lead to neglect of other equally vital
societal concerns.'
Substitution of Non-Unit Workers" Standard. It has been proposed that de-
cision-bargaining should be required only when the employer plans to sub-
stitute non-unit workers for unit workers.' Bargaining would, therefore, always
be required in plant removal cases, but in partial or complete shutdown cases,
it would be required only when the employer intended to begin purchasing the
goods or services previously produced by unit employees from independent
contractors or from another company." This purported "middle ground be-
tween the positions of the Board and the courts"" has as its underlying assump-
tion the belief that decisions to substitute non-unit workers for unit workers
are motivated solely by cost considerations within the unit, whereas decisions
to close a plant partially or completely without purchasing the product else-
where are motivated solely by consideration of costs which are independent of
the costs prevailing within the unit. This approach supposedly requires decision-
bargaining only when the union can affect the decision by offering concessions
which are relevant to the decision.
The fallacy in this approach is its over-simplified economic analysis of busi-
ness decision-making. Surely the approach is correct in at least requiring de-
cision-bargaining where non-unit workers are being substituted for unit work-
ers. Obviously, cost considerations within the unit will be highly relevant to
such a decision, and the union will have important concessions or other cost-
'Nelson, supra note 33, at 756 (emphasis in original).
" "Non-unit workers" is used to indicate those of subcontractors and other employers.
"Unit workers" will indicate workers employed within the plant or unit under discussion.
" Schwarz, Plant Relocation or Partial Teriination--The Duty To Decision-Bargain,





saving suggestions to make at the bargaining table. But there is no justification
for drawing an arbitrary line that forbids decision-bargaining when worker
substitution is not planned. There are many situations in which an employer
might decide to curtail or cease production at a unit primarily because of cost
factors within that unit, and yet would decide not to begin subcontracting or
outside purchase of the product because of other unrelated considerations.
Thus, a localized firm producing a single product might decide that labor
costs at its only plant had risen to the point of unprofitability because of union
organization. Removal to a different plant might be ruled out because of the
inadequacy of the labor supply in surrounding areas. Subcontracting or pur-
chase at another plant might be ruled out because of the lack of a competent
producer in the area. Therefore, in this situation an employer would be making
a termination decision based primarily on costs in the unit, non-unit workers
would not be substituted for unit workers, and yet, under this standard, man-
agement would not have to bargain over the decision, despite the fact that the
union could at negotiations put forth relevant proposals that might affect or
prevent the decision. Legitimate employee interests are at stake regardless of
whether or not non-unit workers are substituted for unit workers, and in almost
all instances, it is conceivable that the union would have some appreciable
suggestions or concessions to make in furtherance of employee interests.
III. THE DECLINE OF DECISION-BARGAINING
There are preliminary indications that, perhaps due to the changing com-
position of the Board membership,' and the consequent shifting in the outlook
of the Board,' the denouement of the Board-court conflict in this area may
be upon us. In General Motors Corp.47 the full Board was faced for the first
time with the question of whether decision-bargaining should be required when
the decision concerns the sale of an existing plant." In light of previous Board
rulings in this area," it might have been supposed that the Board would again
choose to extend its decision-bargaining doctrine. Such was not the case. The
majority of the Board chose instead to hold that:
[The) issue is controlled by the rationale the courts have generally adopted
in closely related cases, that decisions such as this, in which a significant in-
vestment or withdrawal of capital will affect the scope and ultimate direction
of an enterprise, are matters essentially financial and managerial in nature.
They thus lie at the very core of entrepreneurial control, and are not the types
of subjects which Congress intended to encompass within 'rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. '
I For the political implications of the recent appointments to the Board, see N.Y. Times,
Feb. 19, 1970, at 1, col. 4, and Aug. 29, 1970, at 11, col. 3.
" There is "a tendency for certain Board policies to make pendulum-type swings which
reflect shifts in national political administrations." Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforce-
ment of Federal Labor Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 471, 477 (1972). A defense of the NLRB as a
judicial body is found in Miller, The NLRB-Hero or Villain?, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL
FOUNDATION, LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS 317 (1971).
4T 191 N.L.R.B. No. 149, CCH 1971 NLRB Dec. 30,072, noted in 23 SYRAcUsE L.
REv. 170 (1972).4 9 The Board had previously held that there was no bargaining duty regarding the total
sale of a business. Martin Marietta Corp., 159 N.L.R.B. 905 (1966).
4 See notes 22-27 supra, and accompanying text.
5 0 CCH 1971 NLRB Dec. at 30,074.
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Following the lead of the courts, the Board majority relied upon Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard, and found no duty to bargain over
the decision to sell the plant. Members Fanning and Brown dissented. It was
their contention that:
[T~he concurrence in Fibreboard and the dicta with respect to managerial
decisions are not the law of the case. The fact is that the Supreme Court has
not addressed itself directly to the issue here involved, and Fibreboard, while
it may be considered limited in scope, remains the only Supreme Court pro-
nouncement in this area. We therefore would adhere to the Board's develop-
ment of those principles, especially as set out in Ozark Trailers ...."
The dissenters also quoted the Supreme Court decision in John Wiley & Sons
v, Livingston" for the proposition that the objectives of national labor policy
"require that the rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange
their businesses and eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some
protection to the employees from a sudden change in the employment rela-
tionship ..... It was also pointed out that to require effect-bargaining would
be practically meaningless, since the employer would not be in a position
after the sale to significantly control any of its effects on the employees.
Triplex Oil Refining Division of Pentalic Corp.,4 considered by Members
Miller, Jenkins, and Kennedy, presented the question of whether a decision to
close a business completely should be a mandatory bargaining subject. The
Board dismissed the complaint with the observation that "it has been held that
an employer is under no duty to bargain with a union over its closing down
of an entire company or a facility . . ."
It might be contended that General Motors and Triplex do not represent a
change in Board attitude toward decision-bargaining, but rather mark the
outer limits of the area in which the Board will require such bargaining. Has
the Board, in deference to the decisions of the courts of appeals, begun a gen-
eral retreat from its decision-bargaining doctrine? " Or has it, on the other
hand, merely indicated the point beyond which it will not go in requiring
" Id. at 30,075; see text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
22376 U.S. 543 (1964).
521d. at 549.194 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 5 23,705 (Dec. 10, 1971).
52 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 5 23,705, at 30,606.
"In Lowery Trucking Co., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 5 24,090 (Apr.
20, 1972), the employer terminated the operation of one of its interstate truck lines without
decision-bargaining. The trial examiner dismissed the union's 5 8 (a) (5) complaint on the
authority of General Motors. The Board affirmed the dismissal, but only on the basis of a
factual showing that the employer had voluntarily offered to bargain about the decision
and the union refused. The Board found it "unnecessary to rule on the Trial Examiner's
interpretation of the General Motors case." 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 5 24,090, at 31,048.
In Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 5 CCH LAB. L. REP. 23,923 (Feb. 22,
1972), the employer unilaterally terminated the production portion of its tool-designing
plant, leaving open the non-manufacturing aspect of the business, staffed in part by former
production employees. The trial examiner found that the employer had violated § 8(a) (5)
by not decision-bargaining, and ordered reopening of the plant as a remedy. The Board
majority (Members Jenkins and Kennedy) disagreed, contending that although the closing
could be "characterized as a partial closing, the effect of the cessation of manufacturing was
to remove the employer from the business of manufacturing tools." 5 CCH LAB. L. REP.
23,923, at 30,864. The trial examiner's reopening order was thus rejected, since to re-
quire decision-bargaining here would "significantly abridge [the firm's] freedom to man-
age its own affairs." Id. Member Fanning viewed the shutdown as a partial closing, and
would have upheld the trial examiner's order.
19721
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
decision-bargaining--cases of sale or complete shutdown of a business? While
the two cases alone may not be decisive, the changing composition of the
the Board seems likely to foretell something in the nature of a general retreat
from the decision-bargaining doctrine."
Of relevance to this discussion is the recent Supreme Court decision in NLRB
v. Burns International Security Services, Inc." Burns holds that "successor em-
ployers"" are bound to recognize and bargain with an incumbent union, but
that they are not bound by the substantive provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement, negotiated by their predecessors, which they did not assume." Thus,
in those situations in which there will be a successor employer after the im-
plementation of a management decision, there may be less need for decision-
bargaining since the union will still be recognized and can compel the new
employer to bargain."' This differentiation is suggested because the employees
will not be left without a remedy after the decision is made.6" However, since
the successor is not bound by the provisions of the old contract, the manage-
ment decision of the predecessor is likely to cause significant changes in the
employees' conditions of employment. Some may be discharged, a new or
altered product may be produced, and working conditions may be drastically
changed." Therefore, it is felt that the failure to require decision-bargaining
in the appropriate successorship situation would inject an unwarranted element
of economic insecurity into the employer-employee relationship. Both the
successorship doctrine and the decision-bargaining requirement are labor law
concepts contributing to the stability of industrial relations and the institutional
nature of the bargaining relationship. They need not be held to be mutually
exclusive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The basic arguments of those who would, by some standard, limit the types
of termination of employment decisions which should be mandatory subjects
51 See note 45 supra.
5192 S. Ct. 1571 (1972).
"'A "successor employer" is a concern which gains control of a business through pur-
chase, merger, or other means, when the scope of the business thereafter remains substan-
tially the same as evidenced by use of the same employees, production of the same goods
or services, and other factors. See C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 366 (1971).
"The Court thus distinguished Burns from John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543 (1964), in which it was held that a successor was bound to arbitrate (as provided by
the union's contract with his predecessor) the extent to which the successor was obligated
under the pre-existing collective bargaining agreement. 92 S. Ct. at 1581.
" This concept has been mentioned by one writer, although in the context of pre-Burns
successorship doctrine. Rabin, supra note 30, at 828 n.116.
02At the least, successor employers will be required to recognize and bargain with the
incumbent union. The Burns majority seemed to have hopes that successors will assume
even more responsibility.
In many cases, of course, successor employers will find it advantageous not
only to recognize and bargain with the union but also to observe the pre-
existing contract rather than to face uncertainty and turmoil. Also, in a variety
of circumstances involving a merger, stock acquisition, reorganization, or
assets purchase, the Board might properly find as a matter of fact that the suc-
cessor had assumed the obligations under the old contract.
92 S. Ct. at 1584.
" Since there are a number of factors relevant to a determination of whether a succes-
sorship situation exists, these changes would not preclude a finding of successorship if they
were offset by a substantial continuity of business operations as evidenced by the other
criteria used by the Board. See C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 368 (1971).
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of bargaining seem to be that requiring bargaining over such subjects will
infringe upon management's freedom of action,"4 and that "economic efficiency"
will be reduced. Certainly, management will be less free to act unilaterally
when it must negotiate with the representative of the employees over a pro-
posed change in the scope of the operation. But it should be remembered that
the entire raison d'dtre of the National Labor Relations Act is to regulate the
rights and duties of employers, employees, and unions so that disputes may be
settled peacefully.' Management's freedom of action has been irreversibly
restricted by the requirement of collective bargaining embodied in the Act.
The question for consideration is not the theoretical one of whether manage-
ment's freedom of action should be further limited, but, rather, the practical
question of whether it has been effectively so limited-whether termination
of employment decisions affect the "terms and conditions of employment" and
are thus mandatory subjects of bargaining."
It is remarkable that the writers in this area have not focused upon the
extent to which management freedom of action would be reduced by requiring
decision-bargaining in termination of employment disputes. Requiring an em-
ployer to bargain over a proposed decision is not the same as forbidding him
to make the decision. If the employer and the union are unable to reach agree-
ment on the proposed change, so that a genuine impasse has occurred, then
the employer is always free to make the change unilaterally."7 True, an eco-
nomic strike might ensue, but the effectiveness of a strike in termination of
employment disputes is open to serious question."8 The requirement of decision-
bargaining in termination of employment cases may be viewed as a logical
clarification of the scope of the statutory bargaining duty which does not un-
reasonably restrict the freedom of the employer to determine the scope of
his operation. 9
The premise that economic efficiency might be diminished by requiring de-
cision-bargaining0 appears, at best, weak. The very essence of economic
efficiency is reduction of production costs, which might be expected to be the
"Management advocates have also contended that decision-bargaining is disruptive and,
therefore, not compatible with the collective bargaining relationship. Adams & Coleman,
Can Collective Bargaining Survive the Board?, 52 GEO. L.J. 366 (1964).
"The purposes of the Act are many, and are stated at length. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
"The typical view of labor advocates is that the content of the duty to bargain is flexible
and evolutionary, and that whether or not specific subjects are mandatory should be deter-
mined by reference to the purposes of the Act, and not by resort to concepts of management
convenience or management rights. Sigal, The Evolving Duty To Bargain, 52 GEO. L.J.
379 (1964).
"
7 NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1964); Eddie's Chop
House, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 861 (1967); American Laundry Mach. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1574
(1954). This was recognized in Note, Duty To Bargain: Subcontracting, Relocation, and
Partial Termination, 55 GEo. L.J. 879 (1967), which adds: "The right to make the de-
cision unilaterally is not a justifiable incident of managerial prerogative. It must be balanced
against the impact on the bargaining unit and the benefits to be derived from frank, open
discussion." Id. at 922.
68 This is because the employees will in many such cases have no economic power; they
cannot influence their employer by withholding their services since the employer no longer
desires those services. In some cases, however, the employees may be able to influence the
employer by the use of picket lines or other economic weapons.
"9 A similar view was expressed in Comment, Changes in Employer Structure and Opera-
tions and Their Effect on Collective Bargaining Rights, 15 DEPAUL L. REv. 117 (1965).70 See, e.g., Loomis & Herman, Management's Reserved Rights and the NLRB-An Em-
ployer's View, 19 LAB. L.J. 695 (1968).
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result when employees make concessions in an attempt to dissuade the em-
ployer from terminating production. The continuation of employment with
reduced labor costs or under less favorable conditions would seem to further
economic efficiency rather than retard it. While employers required to decision-
bargain would have less control over the timing of changes, the requirement
of decision-bargaining might move them to institute more economically effi-
cient long-range planning concerning the scope of operations.
Economic efficiency and management freedom of action are not the only
values which are relevant to this problem. 1 The interest of employees in their
livelihood is directly involved, and should be given consideration. When
management asserts that the time is near for a change in the scope of the
business, there is an important role to be played by collective bargaining be-
tween union and management. The union will want to examine management's
relevant data, and it may want to submit other data opposing the change en-
tirely or in support of alternative courses of action. Whether the union rejects
all management proposals, or ultimately decides to make concessions or sug-
gestions which will avoid termination of employment, the employees will at
least be allowed a hand in deciding their destiny. Decision-bargaining would
thus seem to be a practice "fundamental to the friendly adjustment of indus-
trial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions."""
'" "The problems (which) collective bargaining is meant to resolve are by no means
solely those of labor which, understandably, is gravely concerned with job security. They
are also the interest of management which has a high stake in industrial peace, and that of
the general public which is also deeply concerned with the welfare of our economic system."
Platt, The Duty To Bargain as Applied to Management Decisions, 19 LAB. L.J. 143, 159
(1968).
" The quotation is from the statement of purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.
29 U.S.C. 5 151 (1970).
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